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BRINGING BITs BACK FROM THE BRINK
INCORPORATING PROGRESSIVE TREATMENT PROVISIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS TO MAINTAIN POLICY SPACE FOR STATE
REGULATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

*Jeremy S Goldstein
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2011, the United Nations (UN), and as proposed by John Ruggie, Special
Representative of the Secretary General, published the Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights (UNGP's), with the objective of "enhancing standards
and practices with regard to business and human rights."' The UNGP's offer
"guidance and recommendations to states and companies" 2 in implementing the
Special Representative of the Secretary General's (SRSG) 2008 Report, the UN
'Protect, Respect, and Remedy' Framework for Business and Human Rights.3
UNGP Article 9 recommends that states "maintain adequate domestic policy space
to meet their human rights obligations when pursuing business-related policy
objectives with other states or business enterprises, for instance through investment
treaties[.]"' Article 9 recognizes the impact that investment treaties, primarily
international investment agreements (HAs) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs),
have on human rights in the modem global economy.' It also posits that IIAs need
not be inherently detrimental to the furtherance of human rights protections when
6
drafting is guided by policy aimed at maintaining adequate domestic policy space.

&

* J.D., C.S. in International Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; B.B.A Baruch College;
2016 Leonard v. B Sutton International Law Writing Award winner. This paper was initially prepared
for the course sustainable development and international trade in Autumn 2014, and subsequently
adapted for the 2016 Sutton Writing Competition. I present a special thank you to Professors Ved
Nanda, Kristi Disney, Annecoos Wiersema, and Paula Rhodes. Thank you to Joseph Apisdorf, Sandra
McCarthy, Ariana Busby and the diligent editing staff at the Denver Journal of International Law
Policy.
1. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework, U.N.
Doc. HRJPUB/I 1/04, at 1 (2011) [hereinafter UNGP].
2. Andrea Shemberg (legal advisor to the U.N. Special Representative to the Secretary General
for Business & Human Rights), StabilizationClauses and Human Rights A Research Project Conducted
for IFC and the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Business and
Human Rights I (May 27, 2009).
3. John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary General), Protect, Respect and Remedy:
a Frameworkfor Business and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008).
4. UNGP, supra note 1, art. 9, at 11 (emphasis added).
5. UNGP, supra note 1, art. 9, at I1.
6. UNGP, supra note 1, art. 9, at I1.
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HAs are agreements between and among states, which "are designed to
protect foreign investment[s] from one country from interference by the
government of the country in which the investment is located."' HAs are typically
embodied as either a BIT between two states or a multilateral investment
agreement among more than two states, and are designed to increase foreign direct
investment (FDI) inflows.' Each BIT is a unique instrument, but all investment
agreements contain fundamental provisions protecting distinct categories of
investor interests.' These categories include the treatment of investment,
nationalization/expropriation, general exceptions, and dispute resolution.'o When
7.

JONATHAN BONNITCHA, IISD REPORT: MYANMAR'S INVESTMENT TREATIES: A REVIEW OF

LEGAL ISSUES IN LIGHT OF RECENT TRENDS I (Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev. ed., 2014).

8. Rational theorists disagree on whether IIAs actually increase FDI. This author believes that
HAs are crucial to attracting investment in order to compete with other nations which also engage in
IIAs. This is discussed in section 11 herein. See generally MARC JACOB, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, (Inst. for Dev. & Peace ed., 2010); Mary Hallward-Dreimeier, Do
Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct Investment? Only a bit... and They Could Bite

(World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Policy Research
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/1 0986/18118.

Working

Paper No.

3121,

2003),

9. The language used to express treatment differs amongst agreements. Often these categories of

interests are not defined in separate provisions and can be confusing, specifically in older treaties. See
generally, e.g., Agreement between the Government of the Peoples Republic of China and the
Government of Jamaica Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
China-Jam., Oct. 26, 1994, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/LA/country/104/treaty/917; Treaty
between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of
Honduras Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Hond., July 1,

1995, T.I.A.S. No. 106-27; Agreement between The Republic of Turkey and The Kingdom of Spain on
the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Turk.-Spain, Feb. 15, 1995,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/HAlcountry/214/treaty/2953. Alternately, some BITs separate
each distinct interest and actor, and include category headings. See generally, e.g., Agreement between

the Republic of Turkey and the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan Concerning the Reciprocal
Promotion
and
Protection
of
Investments,
Turk.-Afg.,
July
10,
2004,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/214/treaty/3; Agreement between the Government of

the Federal Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the Republic of France for the Reciprocal
2003,
June
25,
Eth.-Fr.,
of
Investments,
and
Protection
Promotion
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/72/treaty/1475; Treaty between the United States of

America and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment, U.S.-Uru., Nov. 4, 2005, TIAS No. 06-1101.
10. The language used to express treatment differs amongst agreements. Often these categories of
interests are not defined in separate provisions and can be confusing, specifically in older treaties. See
generally, e.g., Agreement between the Government of the Peoples Republic of China and the
Government of Jamaica Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,

China-Jam., Oct. 26, 1994, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/104/treaty/917; Treaty
between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of
Honduras Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Hond., July 1,

1995, T.I.A.S. No. 106-27; Agreement between The Republic of Turkey and The Kingdom of Spain on
the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Turk.-Spain, Feb. 15, 1995,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/214/treaty/2953. Alternately, some BITs separate
each distinct interest and actor, and include category headings. See generally, e.g., Agreement between

the Republic of Turkey and the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan Concerning the Reciprocal
Promotion

and

Protection

of

Investments,

Turk.-Afg.,

July

10,

2004,
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an unexpected harm occurs to an investment as a result of an action by a host state,
dispute settlement clauses allow a foreign investor, operating under the protection
of a BIT, to file an 'investor-state arbitration' against the host state."
Most pertinent to the cause of their conflict with state-imposed human rights
protections, BITs create only rights for investors without obligations, and only
obligations for host states seemingly unaccompanied by any substantive rights.' 2
Of principle concern are traditional treatment provisions.' 3 These provisions create
substantial rights for investors to file claims restricting host states' 4 domestic
policy space to legislate to meet its international human rights obligations.
This article analyzes methodology for drafting treatment provisions which
reserve states domestic policy space to regulate human rights in-line with UNGP
Article 9. This article examines: state practice in the form of existing treaties,
model IIAs, draft IIAs, and policy statements; recommendations from civil society,
international organizations, and intergovernmental organizations, including various
Model IIA's and Model BIT's; and the work of popular academics and jurists.
Following this introduction, Section II provides background and context on
the issue. Section III briefly presents the history and purpose of lAs, and considers
their efficacy. Section IV introduces the core principles of traditional BITs and
explains how treatment provisions enshrined therein restrict government policy
space regarding human rights regulation. Section V discusses conflicts between
IIAs and international law. Section VI examines UJNGP Article 9 and analyzes its
recommendations in the context of the greater IIA regime. Section VI presents
and analyzes the methodology available for drafting treatment provisions in IIAs in
a manner which heeds the recommendations of UNGP Article 9, by examining
existing and model IIAs and BITs. Section VIII concludes and provides the
author's opinion.
II.

BACKGROUND

John Ruggie, UN Secretary-General Special Representative for Business and
Human Rights, included Article 9 in the UNGP's out of concern for the unequal
distribution of rights and obligations IlAs create, particularly in private investment
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/LA/country/214/treaty/3; Agreement between the Government of
the Federal Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the Republic of France for the Reciprocal
Promotion
and
Protection
of
Investments,
Eth.-Fr.,
June
25,
2003,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IlA/country/72/treaty/1475; Treaty between the United States of
America and the Oriental Republic of Unmguay Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment, U.S.-Uru., Nov. 4, 2005, TIAS No. 06-1101.
I1. See BONNITCHA, supra note 7; Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment
Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT'L L. J. 435, 436 (2009) ("There are sharp disagreements related to the
legitimacy of investment treaty arbitration. The president of Bolivia asserts that developing countries in
Latin America" never win any cases.).
12. BITs were not originally intended to create any obligations on investors. Investors are subject
to the laws of the states in which they do business. See, e.g., Stiglitz, infra note 24, at 5-11.
13. See infra Sections 11 & Ill.
14. See infra Section IV.
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contracts15 and traditional BITs.1 6 The concern is that this unequal distribution
impacts states' domestic policy space relating to human rights and the
environment." When a state regulates in a manner which seeks to protect or
promote a human rights interest,' 8 foreign investors operating under a BIT are
more likely to successfully challenge the measure than those operating without
investment protections.' 9 Damage awards in investor-state arbitrations can reach
into the billions of U.S. dollars.20 In Occidental v. Ecuador, the International
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 2 1 decided that Ecuador had
been in breach of a BIT provision for conduct which was "tantamount to
expropriation." 22 While the fairness of the ultimate decision on the issues is not
under intense scrutiny, the tribunal awarded Occidental US $1.7 billion, even
though Ecuador justified their actions with proof that the company had
intentionally committed other serious regulatory violations. 23 As a result, states
have become fearful of advancing domestic policies, particularly those relating to
24
human rights and the environment, which may encourage claims.
This 'regulatory chill' can affect a plethora of policy decisions not protected

15.

Private investment contracts frequently include stabilization clauses which can explicitly limit

state's domestic policy space to a specific or unlimited degree. Ruggie, supra note 3, at 3, 112-4.
16. Traditional BITs are loosely defined as those developed prior to the advent of modem flA
model agreements and/or those which include unqualified terms of art, lack of domestic policy space,
and few additional exceptions provisions. These are to be described more in detail herein in Section II.
See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government
of the Union of Myanmar on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, China-Myan., Dec. 12,
2001, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/762.
17. George K. Foster, Investors, States and Stakeholders: Power Asymmetries in International
Investment and the Stabilizing Potential of Investment Treaties, Business Law Forum - Balancing
Investor Protections, the Environment, and Human Rights, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 361, 368
(2013).
18. Examples include a state seeking to use police powers to protect citizens from having their
rights violated by a foreign investor, a policy measure designed to encourage basic rights codified in an
International treaty, and an interpretive decision on an environmental and human safety regulation
intended to remedy a legal-loophole under which an investor operates. PETERSON & GRAY, infra note
29, at 5.
19. Id.
20. E.g., Franck, supra note 11, at 435 ("a typical claim might involve an investor demanding
over US$300 million from a host state").
21. ICSID is the largest, and most commonly utilized, International investment arbitration panel.
For more on the Occidental v. Ecuador ruling see, Tai-Heng Cheng & Lucas Bento, ICSID's Largest
Award in History: An Overview of Occidental Petroleum Corporation v the Republic of Ecuador,
KLUWER

ARBITRATION

BLOG

(Dec.

19,

2012),

http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/12/19/icsids-largest-award-in-history-an-overview-ofoccidental-petroleum-corporation-v-the-republic-of-ecuador.
22. Occidental Petrol. Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, T 416
(Oct. 5, 2012), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C80/DC2672_En.pdf.
23. Id. T 876.
24. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Multinational Corporations: Balancing Rights and Responsibilities, 101
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 3, 10 (2007).
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under the traditional BIT regime. 25 This includes domestic measures that are
advanced to achieve legitimate non-investment related policy objectives, such the
strengthening of labor laws, and the introduction human rights or environmental
protections. 26 States with traditional BIT regimes are most susceptible to policy
space restrictions. The chilling effect weighs heaviest on developing nations
because they have the greatest need to continue advancing their regulatory regimes
as compared to states with developed regulatory environments. 27 Developing states
also more frequently engage in traditional BITs relative to developed nations,
making them significantly more susceptible to investor claims. 2 8
The regulatory chill largely escaped concern until recently because foreign
investors only first began to invoke dispute settlement mechanisms in BITs in the
mid-1980's. 29 With the long term consequences of engaging in IIA's now readily
apparent, some states are rapidly moving to denounce their traditional BITs;30 both
Venezuela and Ecuador have terminated agreements." Other nations have selected
to renegotiate agreements; South Africa and Indonesia have begun this process. 32
However, only so much renegotiation is possible. Basic investor protections that
establish discipline on host state measures, generally obliging them to provide
compensation for expropriation, and to treat foreign investors fairly, equitably, and
in a non-discriminatory manner, are intrinsically necessary in any HA.33 For
capitol-importing nations, FDI is crucial to development and the advancement of
social and economic rights. 34 Investor-protective provisions in agreements which

&

&

25. Suzanne A. Spears, The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of International
Investment Agreements, 13(4) J. OF INT'L ECON. L. 1037, 1039 (2010).
26. Id.
27. Howard Mann, Reconceptualizing International Investment Law: Its Role in Sustainable
Development, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 521, 532-33 (2013); United Nations Conference of Trade
Development, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Sequel, UNCTAD series on Issues in International
Investment
Agreements
II
(2012),
2
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/5,
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5 en.pdf ("this approach poses special challenges for
developing countries where the State may be required to intervene in the economy and introduce
legislative or regulatory changes more frequently or of a greater magnitude.").
28. Howard Mann, Reconceptualizing International Investment Law: Its Role in Sustainable
Development, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 521, 532-33 (2013); United Nations Conference of Trade
Development, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Sequel, UNCTAD series on Issues in International
Investment Agreements II(2012), 2 UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/5, http://unctad.org/en/Docs/
unctaddiaeia20 I d5_en.pdf.
29. LUKE ERIC PETERSON & KEVIN R. GRAY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES AND IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 5 (Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev.

ed., 2003).
30. Spears, supra note 25, at 1043.
31.
32.

BONNITCHA, supranote 7, at 7.
BONNITCHA, supranote 7, at 7.

33. Spears, supranote 25, at 1037.
34. These rights considered are defined by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. Sustainable development requires
both FDI and human rights protections, but when done properly can advance ICESCR rights. FDI is
therefore crucial to developing nations' ability to advance economic rights. See Megan Wells Sheffer,
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provide the basis for investor-state claims cannot be entirely eliminated.
Most states concerned about the consequences of engaging in HAs are not
abandoning their agreements in whole. Many recognize that IIA's need not be
inherently detrimental to human rights when drafted in a manner which does not
restrict domestic policy space. These states are now developing model agreements
to guide future IIA drafting in line with UNGP recommendations. Guided by the
UNGP, states, specifically developing nations, should be able to take full
advantage of the positive benefits that HAs have on advancing development
without succumbing to a restriction on their ability to regulate human rights
abuses. This is especially true when those abuses are prohibited by conventions
comprising the International Bill of Human Rights, 35 and those enshrined in ILO
36
conventions enumerating protections for children, minorities, and laborers.
III.
a.

WHAT ARE

HAs?

The History ofllAs

Over the past quarter-century, the number of BITs that comprise the
37
patchwork of the international investment policy regime has skyrocketed;
UNCTAD reports less than 500 agreements before 1980, 1,322 in 1995, 2,495 in
2005, and over 3,000 today." More than 450 investor-state arbitrations claiming
provisions in BITs have been filed, 39 but formal investment treaties had their start
with humble beginnings. The first formal BITs were intended to guarantee foreign
investors protections easily justified as necessary to establish business; such as the
right to freedom from unjustified appropriation by the state,40 the right to pay only
the market tax rate, 41 and the right to operate free of discrimination on the basis of
Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Friend or Foe to Human Rights?, 39 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 483,

&

483 (2011).
35. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (1966); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).
36. Freedom of Association and Right to Organise Convention; Right to Organise and Collective
Bargaining Convention; Forced Labour Convention; Abolition of Forced Labour Convention;
Minimum Age Convention; Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention; Equal Remuneration
Convention; Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention.
37. PETERSON & GRAY, supra note 29, at 7.
38. United Nations Conference on Trade & Development, International Investment Agreements
Navigator (2013), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IA; Stiglitz, supra note 24.
39. Susan L. Karamanian, The Placeof Human Rights in Investor-State Arbitration, 17 LEWIS
CLARK L. REV. 423, 426 (2013).
40. The guarantee of protection from undue appropriation or nationalization without
compensation exists in all BITs and recommended by all models, albeit with slightly varying language.
See,
e.g.,
2012
U.S.
Model
Bilateral
Investment
Treaty,
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf (2012) [hereinafter U.S. Model].
41. National Treatment is guaranteed by all BITs and recommended by all Models. See, e.g.,
Investment,
of
Protection
and
Promotion
the
for
Agreement
Draft
Norway
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nationality. Some scholars argue that BITs are a form of human rights protection in
that they typically guarantee freedom from discrimination due to nationality.4 2
Other scholars highlight the use of treatment provisions during colonial times as
evidence of their sinister roots in catalyzing the exploitation of Africa, the
Americas, and Asia.43
b.

Do HAs Increase FDI?

What impact, if any, do IIAs have on FDI? In the commentary to the UNGP,
the SRSG expressly acknowledges that "[e]conomic agreements concluded by
states.. .such as [BITs].. .create economic opportunities for States[,]"" but does
this opportunity correlate directly to increasing FDI? Numerous quantitative
studies have measured changes in FDI inflows relative to HA proliferation, and the
findings are mixed.45 The prevailing view amongst them is that the relationship
between IIAs and FDI is either unclear,4 or a stalemate. 4 7 Other studies have
found a positive relationship between IIAs and FDI, but only when the study takes
into account other specific factors. 4 8 Some argue that, even in a vacuum, a nation
who executes more HAs will see a resulting gross increase in FDI. 49
As is often true, questioning whether HAs directly stimulate FDI 'when all
other things are equal' is irrelevant, because all things are not equal in this case;
the global economy and political system does not exist in vacuum. Capitalimporting countries, frequently developing nations with weak to moderate
domestic human rights protections, can be effectively trapped in a 'prisoner's
dilemma'.so Conceptually, it would be better for all developing nations with
'evolving' human rights and labor standards to collectively refrain from engaging

http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/DownloadffreatyFile/2873 (2007) [hereinafter Norway Model].
42. See Nicholas Klein, Human Rights and International Investment Protection: Investment
protection as Human Right?, 4(1) GOETTINGEN J. OF INT'L L. 199, 204-09 (2012).
43. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW

1-2, (2d ed. 2012).
44. UNGP, supranote 1, art. 9.

45. BECKY CARTER, HELPDESK RESEARCH REPORT: THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT LAW AND PROCEDURE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT/GROWTH 2 (Governance & Social Development Resource Centre 2013).
46. Jonathan Bonnitcha, Outline of a Normative Frameworkfor Evaluating Interpretations of
Investment Treaty Provisions, EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION (Chester

Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011).
47.
MATTER
48.
49.

50.

NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER ET. AL., INVESTMENT TREATIES AND WHY THEY
TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: QUESTIONS & ANSWERS (2012).
See CARTER, supranote 45, § 2.1.
See Hallward-Dreimeier, supranote 8.

'Prisoners dilemma' describes a decision-making scenario wherein a group of actors would be

collectively better off if they ALL choose 'box a'. However, if any one actor chooses 'box b' that actor

will have an advantage over all other actors. The scenario adds a caveat that while collectively all actors
are better with 'box a,' IF all actors choose 'box b,' then all actors lose their competitive advantage

gained through collective selection of 'box a,' AND it nullifies the individual advantage gained by the
singular actor in breaking rank and choosing 'box b'.
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in IIAs to avoid the 'chill'. However, if one state breaks this collective agreement
it would gain a competitive advantage compared to the rest. Similarly, any nation
lacking near equal investor protections relative to its regional counterparts would
be perceived by investors as relatively more risky to invest in, and hence could
receive less investment."' The prisoners' dilemma reality of IIAs extends to other
parts of the decision making process as well, and is a concern in regards to the
'downward regulatory spiral.' 5 2 It is admitted that the relevance of IIAs to this
analysis does not rest wholly on their efficacy; IIAs exist and will continued to be
proliferated.
IV.

FUNDAMENTAL PROVISIONS IN TRADITIONAL

BITS

The core principles of any BIT are codified in provisions offering protections
to investors relating to the treatment of their investment in the host state. These
53
provisions are the most frequently cited by investors in arbitration claims, and are
5
54
the most controversial. Most agree that the unqualified terms of art in these
provisions, such as favorable treatment and fair and equitable treatment (FET),
lead to inconsistent interpretations by tribunals and contribute to the restrictions on
policy space that states with traditional BITs face. Other scholars disagree that
regulatory space in treatment provisions has any impact on how investors select a
location. 56
a.

National Treatment and Most FavoredNation

National treatment provisions guarantee investors treatment equal-to, or better
than, local investors, and include both pre-investment and post-investment
protections. MFN provisions guarantee investors' treatment equal to any non-party
third-state investors. These two provisions can be included in an IIA separately, or
together as shown here: "[e]ach Contracting Party shall accord to investments of
investors of the other Contracting Party, treatment which shall not be less
favorable than that accorded either to investments of its own investors or investors

51.

See JACOB, supranote 8.

52. 'Downward regulatory spiral' describes the condition of states dismantling domestic reforms
in order to attract FDI and is discussed in Section III herein.
53.

BONNITCHA, supra note 7, at 1.

54. See South African Development Council Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 4 (2012),
http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/sadc-model-bit-template-final.pdf (recommending
the non-inclusion of an MFN provision and the adoption of a different standard to FET for minimum
treatment) [hereinafter SADC MODEL BIT or SADC MODEL].
55. 'Terms of art' are ambiguous phrases which do not clearly infer intent of the drafters to
arbitral panels, including 'Fair and Equitable Treatment' and 'Full Protection and Security.' Thomas
Innes, Stepoe & Johnson LLP, The Adoption of Terms of Art in Bilateral Investment Treaties, Panel
Address at Sutton Colloquium at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law (Nov. 15, 2014).
56. Tomer Broude, Yorman Z. Haftel & Alexander Thompson, Who Cares About Regulatory
Space In BITs? A ComparativeInternationalApproach, HEBREW UNIV. OF JERUSALEM LEGAL STUD.
RES. PAPER SERIES, No. 16-41, at 8, https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2773686.
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of any third state.""
b.

Minimum Standardof Treatment: FET and FPS

Minimum standard of treatment provisions, sometimes referred to 'absolute
standard of treatment', typically include an FET requirement and a 'full protection
and security' (FPS) requirement. The FET standard is designed to be an absolute
standard of treatment, unrelated to how other investments are treated by the host
state." Minimum standard of treatment provisions are the most controversial
provisions in traditional IIAs because they are commonly cited by investors in
arbitrations, and have proven to be a successful basis for claims.59 FET and FPS
provisions permit arbitral tribunals to "look not just at the change in value[,] but
also at the surrounding circumstances"60 of a potential violation of an investors'
rights.
The origin of FET comes from a 1926 international arbitration, Neer v. the
United Mexican States," a commonly cited decision in modem arbitrations. The
Neer tribunal stated that:
[I]n order to constitute an international delinquency, [treatment of a
foreign investment] should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to willful
neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far
short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man
would readily recognize its insufficiency. 62
In an IIA context, the first uses of FET and FPS were in early international
economic agreements such as the Havana Charter for an International Trade
Organization, the US Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties, and the
OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, all developed
between 1948 and 1967.63 These agreements merely stipulate that parties shall
"ensure fair and equitable treatment to the property of nationals of the other
parties," and that "[s]uch property shall be accorded the most constant protection
and security."' FET and FPS provisions which proliferated in HAs over the past
50 years are simply not as robust as the Neer standard. They often mirror the
OECD Draft Convention, merely restating unqualified FET and FPS terms without
57. A common example of a National Treatment provision. This example from Agreement
between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria for
the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 4:2, India-Bulg., Oct. 29, 1998,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/96/treaty/678 (emphasis added).
58. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 27, at 6.
59. Eric De Brabandere, Human Rights Considerations in InternationalInvestment Arbitration,
THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: LEGAL

AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

17 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Panos Merkouris eds., 2012).

60. Stiglitz, supranote 24, at 39.
61. L. F. H. Neer v. United Mexican States, IV R.I.A.A. 60, Opinion of Commissioners,
15, 1926).
62. Id. 14.
63. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 27, at 5.
64. Id.

¶ 6 (Oct.
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reference or definition. Today, there is no generally accepted definition of FET.
The China-Myanmar BIT provides the simplest example of a traditional
unqualified FET provision: "Investments of investors of each Contracting Party
shall all the time be accorded fair and equitable treatment in the territory of the
other Contracting Party." 65
Relying on traditional BIT provisions, modem arbitral tribunals have held
FET to be a widely-accepted principle "encompassing such fundamental standards
as good faith, due process, non-discrimination, and proportionality." 66 Tribunals
have held that regulatory measures which go beyond an investor's 'legitimate
expectations' to one of the fundamental standards listed above can violate the FET
requirement. Investors have claimed a range of harms under the legitimate
expectations standard, including that a state failed to provide a stable legal or
regulatory system, 67 that treatment was unfair and arbitrary due to unintended
68
bureaucratic inefficiencies which caused financial harm to an investment, or that
69
decision.
a state had not acted in 'good faith' when making a regulatory policy
Judgments which penalize a state in reliance on this form of 'good faith'
requirement can have the effect of repudiating states who attempt to enhance
environmental or human rights regulations, or those which make adjudicatory
decisions for the well-being of its citizens. 70 FET provisions traditionally require
7
that states bear the burden of proof in demonstrating good faith. ' Most tribunals
only rule in favor of a state when the "record shows that the [state] treated the
72
Claimant and its investment in good faith, and on equal footing."
Some tribunals, however, have interpreted the standard to be even more
investor friendly; in Tecmed, a tribunal awarded the investor just over US $5
million because the Mexican government refused to renew an operating license for
their landfill, which was polluting drinking water in a local community." The
tribunal held that "a State may treat foreign investment unfairly and inequitably
without necessarily acting in bad faith." 74 This expansion of the good faith
standard places significant burden on states to not only refrain from acting in 'bad

65. Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government
of the Union of Myanmar on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, China-Myan., art. 3, Dec.

12, 2012, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/762 (emphasis added).
66. MTD Equity Sdn. Bdh. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, 1] 109 (May
25, 2004).
261 (Nov.
67. Frontier Petrol. Services Ltd. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 11
12, 2010), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0342.pdf
68. MTD Equity, supra note 66, 1 189.
69. Tecnicas Medioambientales Teemed S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, 11 153 (May 29, 2003).
70.

See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 27.

71. See id.
72. Chemtura Corporation v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award,
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0149_0.pdf.
73. Tecnias Medioambientales Tecmed S.A., supra note 69.

74. Id.

11

153.

¶ 236

(Aug. 2, 2010),
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faith', but to actively engage in 'good faith' actions. This is one way unqualified
BIT provisions can lead to interpretations with the potential to restrict a state's
policy space.
Additionally, in Tecmed, the investor had expected the government was aware
of the long-term investment required to operate a landfill, and had assumed that the
investment and initial approval would lead to a guaranteed re-approval of the
operating license at each scheduled renewal period."
The government's
revocation of the operating license after they discovered the pollution was cited as
evidence of action contrary to the investors "legitimate expectations[.]"" It is
possible this decision has had a restricting effect on the Mexican government's
inclination to make changes to regulations which affect other similar industrial
operations, even if they are found to be polluting communities, placing citizens in
danger. This is an example of indirect regulatory chill.
When determining whether a regulation constitutes unfair or inequitable
treatment, tribunals also consider the 'proportionality' of the harm suffered as
compared to the benefit advanced by the regulatory measure. The tribunal in
Occidental applied a case-by-case test "balancing the interests of the state against
those of the [investor], to assess whether the particular sanction is a proportionate
response in the particular circumstances."" The complication with this is that
multinational enterprises (MNE's) backing foreign investment are often well
equipped to file claims against states regardless of whether the expectation is of
'lower level punishments' that the court suggested may pass scrutiny as
proportionate when there is no direct causal link between the act that the law seeks
to punish and the harm that the law seeks to prevent.78
c.

Stabilization Clauses

Other than these core provisions, there are other types of treatment provisions
which distinctly affect government policy space, the most vilified being
stabilization clauses. Typically inserted in private direct contracts between
investors and states, and rarely included in state-state IIAs, these provisions
guarantee that investment will be exempt from almost all new governmental
regulations regardless of the reason for the measure, or that they will be
compensated for any loss of income resulting from such a change. 9 These
provisions are some of the most damaging to policy space as they explicitly, and

75. See id.
76. Id. 1 88.
77. Occidental Petrol. Corp., supra note 22, ¶ 417.
78. While corporations are undeterred by low-level penalties, they are often conscious of their
image and may choose to employ CSR strategies themselves. Unfortunately, often enough, only the
worst corporate violators are exposed. Stronger penalties are required to deter the worse violators who
have less of a concern for corporate image, including those in the extractives, manufacturing, and
construction industries.
79. See Titus Edjua & Antony Crockett, Human Rights Not Negotiable:Stabilization Clauses and
Human Rights, 28 INT'L FIN. L. REv. 50 (2009).
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by design, prohibit regulation. While demonstrably harmful, stabilization clauses
are appropriately outside of the scope of this analysis because, first, they have
faded from common use, and second, are not commonly included in state-state
BITs.
V.

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS AND
LAW APPLIES?

HAs:

WHICH

What happens when there is a conflict of law between a BIT and another
international treaty to which the responding state is a party? More simply put, do
states' investment obligations supersede the states' other international treaty
obligations? Some authors speak of a "presumption of compliance with
international law[,]" which posits that "the treaty parties would not have intended
that their agreement offends existing rules of international law." 80 However,
arbitral tribunals have rarely ruled in this manner, holding that while a state may
have a responsibility to regulate to the standard of its international obligations, "it
equally is beyond a doubt that the state holds responsibility towards the foreign
investor for the breach of the provisions of the investment treaty""1 if remedy of a
regulatory shortcoming causes the violation. Often this type of claim arises, and is
most critical for state policy space, when a respondent state asserts, in defense of a
claim, that a regulatory measure disputed by an investor was intended to comply
with a human rights obligation.
The complex relationship between relevant international human rights
obligations and obligations owed to investors under a BIT requires an analysis of
what rights and obligations each assigns, and to whom. International human rights
law, including the ICCPR82 and ICESCR, 3 and customary international law
(CIL)84 such as the responsibility to protect (R2P),8 jus cogens, and erga omnes,"
primarily create rights for people and obligations for states. IIAs create rights only
for investors, and obligations for states to protect investors and investments. As the

JACOB, supra note 8, at 28.
81. Brabandere, supra note 59, at 12.
82. ICCPR, supranote 35.
83. ICESCR, supra note 35.

80.

84. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2014) ("International law that derives from the practice

of states and is accepted by them as legally binding.. .This is one of the principal sources or building
blocks of the international legal system.").

85. For more on R2P, see, e.g., Gareth Evans & Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to
Protect, 81 FOR. AFF. 99, 102-03 (2002)
The responsibility to protect implies a [state] duty to react to situations in which there is
compelling need for human protection. If preventive measures fail to resolve or contain such
a situation, and when the state in question is unable or unwilling to step in, then intervention
by other states may be required.
86. Jus cogens are peremptory principles of international law that cannot be overridden by
specific treaties between countries; that is: norms that admit of no derogation; they are binding on all
states at all times, regardless of accession (e.g., prohibitions on aggression, slavery, and genocide).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)
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SRSG wrote in 2007, international human rights treaties do not "impose direct
legal responsibilities on corporations." 7 The responsibility to advance domestic
human rights legislation and protect its citizens from harm is a responsibility that
rests solely on state actors, which includes protecting citizens from harm caused by
investors covered under a BIT." It is easy to see how a conflict could arise
between these obligations.
Some have questioned whether placing robust international legal obligations
directly on investors would solve this dilemma. The SRSG himself, in referencing
the Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of TransnationalCorporationsand Other
Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights," said that criticism of
applying direct responsibilities on businesses through international law was
appropriate because international law has not been "transformed to the point where
it can be said that the broad array international human rights attach direct legal
obligations to corporations."" International law is also ill-equipped to place direct
legal obligations on businesses because the international judicial and monitoring
mechanisms available for enforcement of any potential direct obligations is
lacking.91 While the CSR movement, driven in the area of domestic regulation by
states like India with its mandatory corporate philanthropy tax, 92 is gaining ground,
it is still a largely voluntary regime, and often national in context, not international.
While there is a lack of consensus amongst tribunals on when a state's
international human rights obligations will pre-empt obligations under an
investment agreement or excuse a violation of a BIT provision, preemptory jus
cogens are an exception to the rule. In a case where a term in a BIT were
interpreted to award a corporation damages as a result of a policy measure
designed to prevent jus cogens violations, the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties would invalidate such interpretation. 9 ' Vienna Convention Article 53
states that "A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
87. Report of the SRSG on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises, Business and Human Rights: Mapping InternationalStandards of Responsibility
and Accountabilityfor CorporateActs, UN Doc. 1 44, A/HRC/4/035 (Feb. 9, 2007). It should also be
noted that corporations are now, as a result of some national CSR laws, and for other gross violations,
being held accountable for actions which violate human rights, but this is not yet a common occurrence.
88. Patrick Dumberry & Gabrielle Dumas-Aubin, When and How Allegations of Human Rights
Violations can be Raised in Investor-StateArbitration, 13 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 349, 352 (2012).
89. UN Sub-commission on the Promotions and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the
Responsibilities of TransnationalCorporationsand other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human
Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003) [hereinafter U.N. Draft Norms].
90. Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations
on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006).
91. See Castellino & Bradshaw, Sustainable Development and Social Inclusion: Why a Changed
Approach is Centralto Combating Vulnerability, WASH. INT'L L. J., 459, 467 (2015).
92. See Ananda Das Gupta, Implementing CorporateSocial Responsibility in India: Issues and
the Beyond, IMPLEMENTING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: INDIAN PERSPECTIVES (Ray & Raju

eds., 2014) (India has mandated a 2% tax on all businesses for corporate philanthropy purposes).
93. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1980).
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peremptory norm of general international law." 94 A case presenting such a scenario
is unlikely to occur, however it does highlight an interesting distinction; provisions
within international human rights treaties which have grown to become preemptory
95
norms, such as ICCPR Article 8 prohibiting slavery, torture, and forced labor,
supersede any BIT-based right an investor could claim if conflicting. Additionally,
investors may be held directly accountable for violations ofjus cogens norms these
96
norms under international law.
While conflict of law issues are fundamental to this discussion, there are very
few arbitral tribunals who have ruled directly on them, most seeking to decide such
cases on procedural issues.97 In Azurix Corp. v. the Argentine Republic, the
tribunal gave no consideration to the fact that Azurix failed to make repairs of a
water treatment facility causing an outbreak of dangerous algae in the provincial
water system,9 8 which Argentina claimed was a "violation of its citizens' right to
water[J" 99 The tribunal ultimately did not directly address Argentina's human
rights claim, or provide a holding on the conflict of law issue. The arbitrators
merely issued a judgment in favor of the corporation on the basis of unfair and
arbitrary treatment under an FET standard.' 0 The tribunal did declare a position in
the conflict of law debate, albeit unintentionally; by ignoring the petitioners claim
relating to human rights violations the tribunal made it clear that it is acceptable for
arbitrators to ignore other obligations outside the scope of the IIA's express
mandate.
In the few cases which do affirmatively consider human rights obligations,
most tribunals "seem to be very cautious in elevating human rights laws to the
same status of investment protections[,]"'o' and are "are generally reluctant to
accord significant weight to human rights." 02 In fact, "no investment tribunal has
absolved a [state] that has encountered inconsistent human rights obligations from
03
While
its investment obligations, or reduced the amount of compensation paid."
to a
compensation
to
pay
it is true that as a general policy "[s]tates are not liable

94. Id.
95. ICCPR, supra note 35, art. 8.
96. ICCPR, supra note 35, art. 8.
97. JACOB, supra note 8, at 30.
98. Azurix v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, IIC 24, Award, 1124 (July 14, 2006).
99. U.N. Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15, 1 3944, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Nov. 29, 2002).
100. See Azurix, supra note 98, at Executive Summary. Also, in a similar case against Argentina,

Vivendi v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability (July 30, 2010), the tribunal
did not rule on the conflict of law issue. These cases are some of the primary reasons Argentina is
currently voiding their BITs.
101. Claire Cutler, Human rights Promotions through Transnational Investment Regimes: An
internationalPoliticalEconomy Approach, 1 POLITICs & GOVERNANCE 16, 27 (2013).
102. Moshe Hirsch, Int'l L. Forum at the Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem, The Interaction between
InternationalInvestment Law and Human Rights Treaties: A SociologicalPerspective, Research Paper

no. 06-13, at 228 (2013).
103. Id. at 218.
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foreign investor when, in the normal exercise of their regulatory powers, they
adopt in a non-discriminatory manner bona fide regulations that are aimed at the
general welfare[,]"'" few arbitral tribunals are keen to adopt this holding if
language in the agreement creating such a protection is not explicit.'s
In a slight exception to the rule, some recent tribunals have endorsed the
'clean hands' doctrine, 0 6 giving the English common-law rule weight in arbitral
proceedings. The doctrine may be successfully cited as a state defense when
investors are alleged to have directly contributed to a human rights violation. 0 If a
tribunal comes to the conclusion that an investor has committed a human rights
violation in relation to the disputed investment, it could find the investor's claim
inadmissible as a matter of jurisdiction. 0 A number of tribunals have denied that
they have the jurisdiction to hear claims on the basis inadmissibility due to lack of
'clean hands' for committing acts such as fraud and bribery in the course of the
investment.' This should assuage some human rights concerns, but as the
application of this doctrine is not yet widespread states may still fear that investors
with poor human rights records may be awarded damages as a result of a suit
alleging inequitable regulation of their practices, leading to a regulatory chilling
effect.
One scholar contends that, from a sociological perspective, it is "not
surprising that investment tribunals are generally reluctant to accord significant
weight to human rights treaties in international investment law[,]" because the
"relationships between the social settings involved in human rights laws and
investment laws reveal a considerable socio-cultural divide."" 0o It is possible that
including in BITs explicit references to international human rights treaties, or:to
international law in general, could bridge not only the socio-cultural gap between
these two legal regimes, but also reduce the potential conflicts between them."'
Additional instruction in the language of HAs themselves is necessary to direct
tribunals to engage with international human rights instruments in the case of a
conflict, and in the case of allegations of violations by investors.

104. Saluka Invs. BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arb., Partial Award, 1 255 (Mar. 17, 2006).
105. BITs which include this language explicitly in the general exceptions provisions are discussed
in section VI.
106. Patrick Dumberry & Gabrielle Dumas-Aubin, How to Impose Human Rights Obligations on
CorporationsUnder Investment Treaties? Pragmatic Guidelinesfor the Amendment of BITS, Y.B. ON
INT'L L. & POL'Y 575,575 (2011-2012) (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2012).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 589.
109. See Plama Consortium Limited v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award 1 96 (Aug.
27, 2008); Inceysa Vallisolentana, S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award
192 (Aug. 2, 2006); World Duty Free Company Limited v. Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award
157 (Oct. 4, 2006).
110. Hirsch, supra note 102, at 228-29.
111. Examples of how this can be accomplished follow in section VI.
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UNGP ARTICLE 9

UNGP Article 9 specifically recommends that "States should maintain
adequate domestic policy space to meet their human rights obligations when
pursuing business-related policy objectives with other States or business
2
enterprises, for instance through investment treaties or contracts."" The SRSG's
commentary agrees that while IIAs create economic opportunities for states, "they
3
can also affect the domestic policy space of governments.""l As an example, the
commentary explains that "the terms of [HAs] may constrain States from fully
implementing new human rights legislation, or put them at risk of binding
international arbitration if they do so."'l 4 The SRSG recommends that states retain
15
"adequate policy and regulatory ability to protect human rights"' when drafting
BITs, while balancing that with the need to provide "necessary investor
protections." 116
Some scholars argue that the UNGP was a failure, and fault the SRSG for
catering to industry efforts to stall the progress of sustainable development
These scholars claim that by not creating positive obligations on
efforts.'
investors, the UNGP will not be effective in advancing human rights. Why does
the UNGP merely require that states maintain 'domestic policy space' to regulate
human rights, and not recommend that HA's include requirements that states
implement specific regulations or that investors maintain certain standards? The
answer is two-fold.
First, positive obligations exist in other international human rights
agreements, such as the ICCPR"' and the ICESCR,"I which are open for
accession, and which many nations have eruditely signed. States who accept and
accede to international human rights treaties are typically required to maintain
domestic regulations implementing the standard set by the provisions of the
agreement. For nations not bound by these agreements, jus cogens and erga omnes
still apply.' 2 0 In both situations states are bound by these obligations, however the
duty to correct lax domestic enforcement is entrusted in the UN and the UN
Security Council,' 21 not in investor-state arbitral tribunals. From the perspective of

112. UNGP, supra note 1, art. 9.
113. Id art. 9, Commentary.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id
117. ICCPR, supra note 35.
118. Positive obligations in the ICCPR include; the regulations on use of the death penalty in art.
6, the prohibition on torture in art. 7, and the prohibitions on slavery, servitude, and compulsory labor in
art. 8. ICCPR, supranote 35.
119. Positive obligations in the ICESCR include; the right to work in art. 6, the right to collective
bargaining art. 8, and the requirement of improving all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene
in art. 12. ICESCR, supra note 35.
120. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1980).
121. Id
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international law, positive obligations in IIA's would allow arbitral tribunals to
rule on subject matter far outside of the scope of their mandates.
Second, each state is a sovereign nation with the power to exercise control
over its territory,1 22 and hence is generally free to select its own regulatory regime.
Specific recommendations from the UNGP could invade this right. The SRSG
selects the term policy space as a means of recommending the implementation of
language into IIA's which will reduce restrictions placed on a host states ability to
make legitimate policy decisions regarding human rights regulation, while not
mandating that any specific regulatory changes be made. The choice is left to each
state to develop their domestic regulations in compliance with international human
rights standards.
In an ideal-world, each state would be an efficient, effective actor, with the
power to regulate and enforce domestic human rights regulations, and the will do
to so. This ideal state would always fulfill its internationally binding obligations to
protect its citizens as required by the international instruments they are party to,
and would therefore would be best positioned to regulate investors operating
within in its sovereign territory.' 23 UNGP Article 1 even recognizes the state
responsibility to protect as a core duty which guides the remainder of the
recommendations.1

24

The ideal scenario for a developing state which completely and effectively
implements JNGP Article 9 recommendations into its BIT regime is as follows.
The developing nation proliferates a progressive BIT regime, effectively catalyzing
growth in FDI inflows, kick-starting its economy. As a result of the FDI boom, the
state's available financial resources increase and are allocated to the development
and enforcement of domestic regulations. State citizens then enjoy increased
quality of life resulting from economic development coupled with increased
protection from harms caused by investment.
In the current geopolitical system, some states can effectively regulate and
enforce domestic prohibitions on human rights abuses, but many cannot.1 25
"Because of the overwhelming economic power" 26 of some foreign investors,
many states, particularly developing nations, may not have the resources to
effectively regulate or enforce human rights laws.1 27 Additional capacity building
and resource sharing is required to overcome this gap.
The UNGP recommendation expressly allows for a case-specific and
differentiated analysis of policy space to be done by each state internally. It
refrains from infringing on state sovereignty or creating obligations which cannot
be adequately implemented. If policy space is the answer, the real question then

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

U.N. Charter art. 2, 11.
Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supranote 88, at 352.
UNGP, supra note 1, art. 1.
Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 88, at 371.
Id. at 352.
Id.
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becomes, what is the best way for states to effectively heed the UNGP Article 9
recommendations and maintain domestic policy space to regulate human rights
when engaging in HAs?
VII.

MAINTAINING POLICY SPACE IN IIAs

There are numerous ways to ensure that when engaging in an IIA a state
protects its domestic policy space to regulate human rights, some of which are
evidenced in state practice.1 2 8 Structurally, states can renegotiate existing BITs,
void their BITs and draft entirely new ones, or implement interpretative
addendums to existing treaties that clarify provisions.129 Interpretive language can
be inserted into provisions to clarify ambiguous terms of art; traditional provisions
can be expanded to provide additional protections for human rights and policy
space; additional provisions can be added which explicitly protect governmental
policy space; and, most controversially, positive obligations can be inserted into
BITs which place direct responsibilities on corporations and states to protect
human rights. The following sections present various methodology, as utilized by
some existing IIAs and models.
Section A briefly questions the efficacy of two untenable options which have
been recommended; section B discusses additional language that can be inserted
into agreements; section C analyzes interpretive language that can be included in
troublesome provisions; section D considers general exceptions provisions; section
E highlights potential additional provisions which can be added to bolster the
30
treaty, although not all are recommended for use therein.
a.

Untenable Options

There are several unrealistic and untenable methods which have been
suggested to universalize international investment law in a way that would reduce
the regulatory chill and assist states in better maintaining domestic policy space to
regulate human rights. A global Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) has
been proposed and rejected twice, most recently one that was developed by the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1995."' A
global MAI, complete with robust provisions protecting domestic policy space,
would go a long way to alleviating the regulatory chill. A global MAI is untenable,
simply because all nations have different needs, and as recent history shows, even
smaller 'dozen-nation' IIAs such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement take
years to develop.' 3 2
128. JACOB, supra note 8, at 33.
129. JACOB, supra note 8, at 33.

130. This section proceeds without distinction between 'void and re-draft' and 'renegotiation'
methods of adapting agreements.
131. Organization for the Economic Co-operation and Development, Multilateral Agreement on
Investment Draft Consolidated Text, DAFFE/MAI(98)7/REV 1, 95 (Apr. 22, 1998) (not enacted).
132.

IAN F.

FERGUSSON ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH

SERV., 7-5700,

THE TRANS-PACIFIC

PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (TPP): IN BRIEF, summary (Feb. 9, 2016) (It took 5 years of negotiation to
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Others have suggested amending the International Centre on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States Convention
(ICSID convention), which arbitrates a vast majority of investment disputes, in
order to allow tribunals to consider international human rights law when hearing
cases.1 3 Most scholars agree that amending this treaty is 'nearly impossible', as it
has not been changed since 1965 and has resisted other more spirited attacks on its
severe rigidity.' 34
This is not to say that neither of these changes cannot be accomplished; only
that it would be exceedingly difficult.
b.

PreambularLanguage

Preambular language referencing international human rights treaties,
principles of international law, or other international obligations may help states
maintain domestic policy space in IAAs. While preambular language is not
binding, it can be important in arbitral interpretation.
It allows tribunals to adopt
an approach that places more weight on international human rights treaties, even if
not explicitly controlling.13 6
A preamble, proffered by the South African Development Community Model
Bilateral Investment Treaty (SADC Model) includes a recognition that sustainable
development led by FDI can encourage the "furtherance of human rights and
human development."' 37 It also states that
[r]eaffirming the right of the State Parties to regulate and to introduce
new measures relating to investments in their territories in order to meet
national policy objectives, and-taking into account any asymmetries
with respect to the measures in place-the particular need of developing
countries to exercise this right[.]

3

1

This paragraph highlights three important things. First, that states have a right
to regulate and meet national policy objectives, explicitly creating state rights
under the IIA. Second, that there may be asymmetries in domestic legislation
which need to be corrected, noting that investors should expect future regulation to
shore-up those asymmetries. This language is adapted from the World Trade
Organization's General Agreement on Trade in Services (WTO GATS),"' which

agree on a final publishable draft of the TPP); MAUDE BARLOW & TONY CLARKE, MAI AND THE
THREAT TO AMERICAN FREEDOM (1998).

133. Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 88, at 358.
134. Id. at 578; CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY art. 65 (2d

ed. 2009). Also, while this author (I) notes that it is illogical, and usually failure-inspiring, to assume
that anything which has not been accomplished in a long time is impossible,. it is justifiable in this
situation.
135. JACOB, supra note 8, at 34.
136. Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 88, at 359.
137. SADC Model, supra note 54.
138. Id. (emphasis added).
139. World Trade Organization, General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
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many developed nations are party to, and therefore "is likely to be universally
accepted." 1 40 Third, that this is especially true for developing states who are just
beginning to regulate.
The preamble to the Model International Agreement on Investment for
Sustainable Development (IISD Model)141 makes no explicit reference to human
rights, instead focusing on sustainable development and existing international law.
It begins by stating that the goal of the agreement is to promote sustainable
development through investment,1 42 defining sustainable development as per the
1992 Rio Declaration.1 43 The IISD Model preamble continues by "affirming the
progressive development of international law and policy on the relationships
44
between enterprises and host governments as seen in.. .the [ILO Declaration],'
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 14 and the [UN Draft
Norms].1 46 The preamble adds that it is "seeking an overall balance of rights and
obligations in international investment between investors, host countries and home
countries," 4 7 which is language that strikes right at the heart of the issue while
leaving appropriate room for states and investors to perceive both benefits and
obligations.
The clear majority of other national model agreements do not explicitly assert
human rights or international legal instruments in the preamble. The US Model
states that it desires to increase investment "in a manner consistent with the
protection of health, safety, and the environment, and the promotion of
48
State regulation of international
internationally recognized labor rights."'
obligations under labor treaties is crucial to advancing sustainable development,
and they are likely be applicable in arbitral disputes, however preambular language
of this kind does not create an explicit recognition that labor rights supersede
investor rights under an IIA.
Other nations' model agreements are less robust. The Canadian Model BIT
preamble has just one provision which references a desire to promote sustainable

140. Id
141. International Institute for Sustainable Development, Model International Agreement on
Investment for Sustainable Development (2005) [hereinafter IISD Model] (developed by the
International Institute for Sustainable Development [hereinafter IISD]).
142. Id. at preamble.
143. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 314, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.l
(Vol.1), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) (sustainable development is defined as "[t]he right to development
must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future
generations.").
144. International Labor Organization Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
and its Follow-up, Annex 1, 27A.Doc/v3 (June 19, 1998).
145. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises (2008).
146. U.N. Draft Norms, supra note 89.
147. IISD Model, supra note 141, at preamble.
148. SADC MODEL BIT, supra note 54.
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development,1 49 the German Model BIT preamble merely recognizes that
encouraging investment is "apt to stimulate...the prosperity of both nations[,]"'s
and the French Model BIT preamble has no reference to sustainable development,
human rights, or labor rights.' 5
Other European nations have been more inclusive when drafting model BIT
preambles. One of the most progressive national model BITs, which was never
formally adopted, is the 2007 Norwegian Draft Model BIT. Its preamble has a
number of paragraphs which collectively highlight the importance of "health,
safety, and the environment[," "internationally recognized labor rights[,]"
"corporate social responsibility [(CSR)][,]" "obligations under international law[,]"
"human rights and fundamental freedoms[J" "principles set out in the [UNI
Charter and the [JDHIR][J" and "provisions of international agreements relating to
the environment[.]"l 5 2 The breadth of its preambular reference to human rights and
international law may have been why this model was never formally adopted.
The Investment Agreement for the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa Common Investment Area (COMESA IA) is one of the most progressive
active IAs.' 53 It is in use by nations in the Southern African regional association,
including South Africa. In preface to its 'Part Two', which contains substantive
rights and obligations of investors, the COMESA IA expressly requires an "overall
balance of rights and obligations between investors and Member States." 5 4
Preambular language is effective at presenting the object and purpose of the
treaty, and may be considered by arbitral tribunals when interpreting the intent of
ambiguous language in a provision of an IIA. Most importantly however, it is,
invariably, non-binding. For a state to effectively maintain domestic policy space
to regulate human rights, it must look beyond the preamble of the IIA.
c.

Interpretive Language

Several progressive BITs and IlAs include additional interpretive language
defining the intended scope and meaning of BIT provisions. Frequently, this
language is added to traditional treatment provisions to clarify ambiguous
terminology and standards. Interpretive language is most effective in defining and
clarifying language in treatment provisions.

149. Canada Model Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (2004) [hereinafter
Canada Model].
150. German Model Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments (2008) [hereinafter German Model].
151.

Draft France Model Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments

(2008) [hereinafter France Model].
152. Norway Draft Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment (2007) [hereinafter
Norway Model].
153. Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, Investment Agreement for the COMESA
Common Investment Area art. 11, Rmm/(07) (2007) [hereinafter COMESA [A] (this agreement is
progressive throughout its text).

154. Id.
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Interpretive Language in National Treatment and MFN

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations Comprehensive Investment
Agreement (ASEAN CIA) requires host states to accord investors "treatment no
less favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own
investors[.]"' 5 The language 'in like circumstances' "ensure(s) that a broad view
is taken, rather than simply a narrow question of whether the investors are in the
same or related or competitive sector."' This additional text "ensures the reasons
157
for any measures can be fully considered" by tribunals.
The limitation of the language 'in like circumstances' is that it leaves the
interpretation of what 'like circumstances' should include to the discretion of the
tribunal. The COMESA IA has the same language as the ASEAN CIA, but adds
that "[f]or greater certainty, references to 'like circumstances' in paragraph 1 of
this Article requires an overall examination on a case by case bases of all the
circumstances of an investment."' 8 It explains that the circumstances of an
investment include; "its effects on third persons and the local community[,]"
"effects on the [environment][,]" its sector, the "aim of the measure concerned[,]"
59
the common regulatory process applied to the type of measure, and other factors.'
Few modem BITs contain interpretive language as comprehensive as the
60
COMESA IA.1
Some progressive national treatment and MFN provisions include additional
language which limits the scope of application to specific investor actions. The
Finland - Zambia BIT guarantees investors national treatment with respect only to
"the acquisition, expansion, operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment
6
and sale or other disposal of investments."' ' By limiting the scope of nondiscrimination provisions within each clause the state can exclude claims to
"existing or new measures that may be inconsistent with the non-discrimination
obligations." 62 Similarly, many progressive national treatment and MFN
provisions include additional qualified exemptions for non-conforming measures,
taxation, and other international investment treaties to which the state may be a

155. Association of South East Asian Nations Comprehensive Investment Agreement art. 5, Feb.
26, 2009, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3095 [hereinafter ASEAN CIA
or CIA] (emphasis added).
156. SADC MODEL, supra note 54, art. 4.
157. Id. (emphasis added).
158. COMESA IA, supra 153, art. 17 (emphasis added).
159. Id.
160. E.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Kuwait, Sept. 26,
2011, 2014 Can. T.S. No. 2014/5, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/35/treaty/788
(The national treatment provision does include the language 'like circumstances,' but does not have any
defining clause).
161. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of the

Republic of Zambia on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Fin.-Zam., art. III,
2005, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/232/treaty/1 552 (not in force).
162. SADC MODEL, supra note 54.
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Other BITs explicitly list ways in which the state can be found to have
provided 'treatment less favorable' to the exclusion of others possible ways. The
Germany - Oman BIT list includes, among others, that treatment less favorable
may include "unequal treatment in the case of restrictions on the purchase of raw
or auxiliary materials, of energy or fuel or of means of production or operation of
any kind, unequal treatment in the case of impeding the marketing of products
inside or outside the country."'
For a state to effectively reduce restrictions on its domestic policy space
regarding human rights obligations, the minimum language recommended for a
national treatment or MFN clause would be something similar to US Model Article
3. This provision includes a 'like circumstances' requirement, limits the scope of
the provision to the "establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct,
operation, and sale or other disposition of investment[,]" and has exceptions for
regional government treatment.' 6 5 National treatment and MFN provisions are not
the only ones which cause worry for states; FET and FPS provisions also have a
profound effect on policy space.
2.

Interpretive Language in FET and FPS

The use of interpretive language in FET provisions often expressly directs
tribunals to apply provisions in a manner that is the least restrictive of the host
state's domestic policy space. Due to the generally risky nature of unqualified FET
provisions, the inclusion of interpretive language in these provisions may be the
single most effective method by which states can protect their policy space.
Among the common qualifiers added to these provisions is language
explaining that "treatment [is] in accordance with customary international
law[.]"l 66 This language clarifies that FET does not require treatment beyond the
minimum required by CIL. 67 However, this is often confusing to tribunals because
"there are further difficulties in determining precisely what standard is required by
[CIL]."'6 In the US Model, following basic FET and FPS provisions,1 69 a longer
explanatory clause states that "for greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the
customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the

163. See, e.g., Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Sultanate of Oman
concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Ger.-Oman, art. 3, ¶ 4-7,
May 30, 2007, 1475 U.N.T.S. 261, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctadorg/IIA/country/159/treaty/1731.
164. Id. T 3 ( addressing "measure[s] that have to be taken for reasons of public security and order,
public health or morality[j" by exempting those from the provisions requirement).
165. U.S. Model, supra note 40, art. 3.
166. Id. art. 5, 11.
167.

BONNITCHA, supra note 7,

§ 3.2.1.

168. Id.
169. U.S. Model, supra note 40, art. 5, 1 1 ("Each Party shall accord to covered investments
treatment in accordance with customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and
full protection and security.").
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minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to covered investments."' 7 0 it
continues, "the concepts of [FET] and [FPS] do not require treatment in addition to
or beyond that which is required by that standard, and do not create additional
substantive rights.""' This explanation distinctly qualifies FET and FPS, explicitly
prohibiting some ways in which investors have been able to file illegitimate
claims, such as by claiming 'regulatory stability', which is not required by CIL.
"By limiting the source of FET to [CIL], these treaties seek to rein in the
discretion of tribunals" and says "to arbitrators that [they] cannot go beyond what
[CIL] declares to be the content of the minimum standard of treatment."' 72 The US
Model goes even further by specifically defining FET as "the obligation not to
deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in
accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal
systems of the world;"" 3 and defines FPS as requiring "each Party to provide the
level of police protection required under [CIL]."'74
The COMESA IA approaches this issue from a different perspective. It states
that FET is merely the minimum standard required under CIL, but adds "[s]tates
understand that different [states] have different forms of administrative, legislative
and judicial systems, and that [states] at different levels of development may not
achieve the same standard at the same time."'7 1 While this provision does leave
more decisions to the discretion of tribunals, it allows them to consider more
broadly the needs of developing nations when applying the FET standard.
The recently published TPP 76 stipulates the minimum standard of treatment
owed to covered investments is "treatment in accordance with applicable
customary international law principles, including fair and equitable treatment and
full protection and security.""' This language qualifies FET and FPS as merely
subsets of customary international law principles. The TPP states that, "[fjor
greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary international law minimum
standard of treatment of aliens as the standard of treatment to be afforded to
covered investments," and continues by stipulating that "[t]he concepts of [FET]
and [FPS] do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required
78
by that standard, and do not create additional substantive rights."1
170. Id. T 2 (emphasis added).
17 1. Id.
172. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Fairand Equitable Treatment, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/DIAEIA/2011/5, at 28 (2012).
173. U.S. Model, supra note 40, art. 5, T 2a.
174. Id. T 2b.
175. COMESA IA, supra note 153, at art. 14.
176. TPP, supra note 132. The agreement, negotiated between nations representing 40% of the
world's economy, is far from guaranteed to be implemented as of now, but presents some exceptional
examples of policy space protective language. TPP signatory nations are: The United States, Canada,
Mexico, Peru, Chile, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, Australia, and New Zealand. As of
December 2016, it seems likely that the TTP will not go into effect.
177. Id art. 9.6(1).
178. Id. art. 9.6(2).
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To ensure that tribunals consider the minimum standard of treatment as the
lowest possible standard required under international law, the TPP expressly
defines FET as including "the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil or
administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due
process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world[,]"' 9 and FPS as
requiring "each Party to provide the level of police protection required under
customary international law."80
The TPP also directly addresses concerns of civil society that 'legitimate
expectation' claims can still be brought under a partially qualified FET provision;
"the mere fact that.a Party takes or fails to take an action that may be inconsistent
with an investor's expectations does not constitute a breach of this Article, even if
there is loss or damage to the covered investment as a result."'"' It states further
that "[flor greater certainty, the mere fact that a subsidy or grant has not been
issued, renewed or maintained, or has been modified or reduced, by a Party, does
not constitute a breach of this Article, even if there is loss or damage to the
covered investment as a result."' 82 This reduces fears that states may place
themselves at risk by using subsidies or grants to attract investment or incentivize
good behavior.
The SADC Model recommends against the inclusion of any FET standard,
instead suggesting a 'fair administrative treatment' standard be used.'8" Fair
administrative treatment requires that, taking into account the level ofdevelopment,
"administrative, legislative, and judicial processes do not operate in a manner that
is arbitrary or that denies justice." 8 4 it also guarantees that investors will be
"notified in a timely manner of administrating or judicial proceedings that directly
affect investment"; that there exists a "right of appeal"; that investors will have
"access to government-held information" in a timely manner; and that states will
"progressively strive to improve the transparency, efficiency, independence, and
accountability" of their governmental processes.'
As a more traditional alternative, the SADC Model does provide an example
of a reduced FET standard for use if needed, which requires "the demonstration of
an act or action by the government that are an outrage, in bad faith, a willful
neglect of fury or an insufficiency so far short of international standards that every
reasonable and impartial person would readily recognize its insufficiency."' 86 Even
this standard, the SADC posits, can lead to unintended claims.'87
Only South Africa and other COMESA state have even considered adopting
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. art. 9.6(2)(a).
TPP, supranote 132, art. 9.6(2)(b).
Id.art.9.6(4).
Id. art. 9.6(5).
SADC MODEL, supranote 54, art. 5.
Id. art. 5.1 (option 2).
Id. art 5.2-5.5 (option 2).
Id. art. 5.2 (option 1).
Id. art. 5.
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the SADC Model's fair administrative treatment requirements.' 88 Some of the
interpretive language presented in the US Model, the TPP, and other progressive
model BITs is becoming more commonly used. The addition of interpretive
language into existing provisions in IIAs may be the most effective method of
maintaining domestic policy space to regulate human rights, but other changes are
also possible.
d.

GeneralExceptions Provisions

Most IIAs include a general exceptions provision which exempts certain types
of regulatory measures from application. Common exceptions include those for
non-conforming measures, taxation, and national security.' 89 The Canada Model
BIT specifically addresses issues with policy space in its general exceptions
provision, emphasizing that the guarantees therein do not apply to a party
enforcing measures to "protect human, animal or plant life or health[,]" taking
action "in pursuance of its obligations under the [UN] Charter[,]" or to any
investments in "cultural" industries.' 90 The last requirement, for actions relating to
any cultural industries, can be especially protective of human rights policy space
because of the potentially sensitive rights involved, such as those enumerated in
the ICCPR and CERD. 9
Another approach, adopted by the US Model, is to not include a single
general exceptions clause, but to provide separate provisions which create
exceptions specifically for taxation, non-conforming measures, national security,
financial services industries, and ones which intend to reduce regulatory chill.1 92
The TPP follows in a similar vein, mandating that no investment provisions "shall
be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any
measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to
ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to
environmental, health or other regulatory objectives." 93 The most confounding
approach is evident in the ASEAN CIA, which merely exempts from application of
the IIA any measures "necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations
which are not inconsistent with this agreement."94 It is unclear what measures
would be inconsistent with the agreement itself, leaving this determination to the
discretion of the tribunal.

188. The SADC MODEL was heavily considered in the drafting of the COMESA IA, over which
South Africa had a great influence.
189. See Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of the
Union of Myanmar for the Liberalization, Promotion and Protection of Investment art. 7, Japan-Myan.,

Dec. 15, 2013, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/105/treaty/2155.
190. Canada Model, supranote 149, art. 10.
191.

See generally ICCPR, supra note 35; International Convention on the Elimination of All

Forms of Racial Discrimination, Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1966).
192. U.S. Model, supra note 40,passim.
193. TPP, supra note 132, art. 9.15 (emphasis added).
194. ASEAN CIA, supra note 155, art. 17.
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Additional Approaches

There are two categories of novel provisions, less common than those
previously presented, which are intended to maintain state domestic policy space.
The first category is one of 'passive provisions'; those which provide exceptions
for certain industries, types of activity, or sectors, like the approach taken by the
US Model."' Included in this category are inventive provisions which are likely to
be effective, and be universally accepted by states.
Several scholars and international organizations have also recommended the
inclusion of provisions from a second category, those which place 'positive
obligations' on states and investors in a few specific areas of international law,
including human rights, labor rights, environmental protection, and anticorruption.1 96 These provisions are more aggressive and more controversial. They
expand international legal obligations of states and have a larger negative financial
impact on investors.
1.

'Passive Provisions'

One passive provision, which is arguably successful at preventing a
regulatory 'race to the bottom',' 97 requires that member states "not waive or
otherwise derogate from or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from measures
concerning labour, public health, safety or the environment as an encouragement
for the establishment, expansion or retention of investments."' 9 While this does
eliminate the ability of states to reduce regulations to attract investment, it has no
protection for states who wish to improve their regulations from the current
baselines. Most BITs are concluded between developing and developed nations ' 99
providing little benefit to the developing nation where human rights abuses 'are
more likely to occur due to weak regulation and inadequate enforcement.20
The SADC Model recommends the inclusion of a 'right to regulate' clause as
a stand-alone provision in BITs;2 0 1 "In accordance with [CIL] . . . the Host State
has the right to take regulatory or other measures to ensure that development in its
territory is consistent with the goals and principles of sustainable development, and

195. U.S. Model, supra note 40, art. 14-21.
196. Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 88, at 356-58; see, e.g., SADC MODEL, supra note
54, art. 13 (placing pre- and post-entry impact assessment requirements on states and investors).
197. Definition
of
race
to
the
bottom,
FINANCIAL
TIMES
LEXICON,
http://lexicon.ft.com/Termterm-race-to-the-bottom (last visited Apr. 20, 2015) ("The situation in
which companies and countries try to compete with each other by cutting wages and living standards
for workers, and the production of goods is moved to the place where the wages are lowest and the
workers have the fewest rights").
198. COMESA IA, supra note 153, art. 5.
199. J ANTHONY VANDUZER ET AL., INTEGRATING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT INTO
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Aug. 2012),
https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/6thannualforumcommonwealthguide.pdf.

200. Id
201. SADC MODEL, supranote 54, art. 20.
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with other legitimate social and economic policy objectives." 202 This provision
explicitly protects policy space relating to measures designed to advance
sustainable development, which are often directly related to measures seeking to
regulate human rights. 203 The IISD Model has a similar provision in Article 25
titled "[i]nherent rights of states[,]" and recommends that this clause, when
included, should be featured in a stand-alone provision. 204
The TPP, in an effort to increase the number of enterprises voluntarily
employing internal CSR programs, states that parties "reaffirm the importance of
each Party encouraging enterprises operating within its territory or subject to its
jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate into their internal policies those
internationally recognised standards, guidelines and principles of corporate social
205
While
responsibility that have been endorsed or are supported by that Party."
this does not create any mandatory obligations, it is one of the first such clauses
included in an active IIA, highlights the importance of social issues, and reaffirms
the notion that investors have a responsibility to people in the countries in which
they operate.
Passive provisions can benefit states seeking to maintain domestic policy
space. Many of these inventive provisions, while quite uncommon, are efficient at
addressing state concerns without creating significantly burdensome fears for
investors. Nonetheless, some progressive IIAs go further, prescribing positive
obligations on both states and investors.
2.

Positive Obligations

The inclusion of positive obligations in IIAs as a method for maintaining
domestic policy space to regulate human rights is controversial. Provisions of this
type are diverse. They include provisions requiring recognition of environmental
impact from investments, 206 specifically requiring parties to reaffirm their
obligations to the ILO and other international treaties, 207 requiring both pre-entry
and post-entry impact assessments on investments, 2 08 and creating direct human
rights obligations. Some of these provisions are more widely accepted, such as
those in the US Model; some are less widely accepted, such as those in the SADC
Model.
A.

Reference to Human Rights and Labor Treaties

One method by which a BIT may implicate international labor rights or
human rights without directly obligating a state to bring its domestic regulations in

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id (emphasis added).
Id.
IISD Model, supra note 141, art. 25.
TPP, supra note 132, art. 9.17.
U.S. Model, supranote 40, art. 12.
Id art. 13.
SADC MODEL, supra note 54, art. 13.
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line with international labor standard2" is to implement language similar to the US
Model. US Model Article 13 requires that parties "reaffirm their respective
obligations as members of the Intemational Labor Organization (ILO) and their
commitments under the [ILO Declaration]."2"o While this provision does not create
additional substantive obligations or new grievance mechanisms, it does highlight
the importance of international labor rights. 211 It also requires that states not
weaken or reduce protections afforded by domestic labor laws or fail to enforce
domestic laws as an encouragement for investment. 212
COMESA IA Article 22 states that "nothing in this agreement shall be
construed to preclude a [state] from applying measures that it considers necessary
for its obligations under the [UN] Charter... with respect to the protection of its
own essential security interests." 213 This type of provision can be expanded to
include any international agreement. TPP Article 19.3 states that "each Party shall
adopt and maintain in its statutes and regulations, and practices thereunder, the
following rights as stated in the ILO Declaration." 2 14
This type of provision creates obligations through reference to existing
international law, but there is no consistent pattern of arbitral tribunal
interpretation to discern the effect this will have on increasing policy space.
B. Direct Human Rights Obligations
The most controversial provisions are those which create direct human rights
obligations on states and investors without direct reference to a treaty. SADC
Model requires that "[i]nvestors and their investments have a duty to respect
human rights in the workplace and in the community and State in which they are
located. Investors and their investments shall not undertake or cause to! be
undertaken acts that breach such human rights." 215 The HSD Model repeats this
language and adds a clause which may be interpreted to expressly dictate that
international human rights treaty obligations supersede BIT obligations; "Investors
and Investments shall not manage or operate... in a manner that circumvents
international environmental, labour and human rights obligations to which the host
state and/or home state are Parties." 216

209. Jeffrey S. Vogt, Trade and Investment Arrangements and Labor Rights, CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACTS: NEW EXPECTATIONS AND PARADIGMS (Lara Blecher,

et. al. eds., 2014).
210. U.S. Model, supra note 40, at art. 13; ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights
at
Work
and
its
Follow-up,
June
15,
2010,
http://ilo.org/declaration/info/publications/WCMS_467653/lang-en/index.htm.
211. U.S. Model, supra note 40, art. 13.
212. Id.
213. COMESA [A, supra note 153, art. 22.
214. TPP, supra note 132, art. 19.3. This chapter of the TPP is binding on states and investors and
is relevant to all investment provisions.
215. SADC MODEL, supranote 54, art. 15.
216. IISD Model, supra note 141, art. 14.
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TPP chapter 19 expressly enumerates its own prohibitions, closely related but
not identical to, the ILO Declaration Fundamental Principles; "each Party
[recognize] the goal of eliminating all forms of forced or compulsory labour,
21 7
The TPP also expressly
including forced or compulsory child labour."
encourages businesses operating under the IIA to move to a forced labor free
supply and manufacturing chain; each party is to "discourage, through initiatives it
considers appropriate, the importation of goods from other sources produced in
whole or in part by forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory
child labour."21 8
These provisions may help to reduce, and in some cases explicitly prevent, the
chilling effect in designated policy areas. Most investors, however, fear the
uncertainty of broad and unqualified language which may allow a state to act in a
truly arbitrary or unfair manner.
C.

Essential Elements Clause

The EU-Central America BIT (EUCAA) includes an 'essential elements'
219
The EUCAA states that
clause, which explicitly references human rights law.
"[r]espect for democratic principles and fundamental human rights, as laid down in
the [UDHR]," and for the principle of the rule of law, underpins the internal and
international policies of both parties and constitutes an essential element of this
agreement. 2 2 0 While most of the fundamental JDHR obligations have become jus
cogens norms, and therefore already enforceable in investment arbitration, the
remainder of the treaty has a relatively "high level of human rights protection in
22
relation to the rights mentioned" in BITs. 1 The inclusion of an essential elements
clause protects the host states ability to regulate the worst human rights offenses
perpetrated by business, and meet UDHR standards, without radically altering
substantive language found in traditional BITs.
D.

Impact Assessments

223
BITs suggest provisions requiring
The IISD Model 222 and SADC Model
pre-entry and post-entry impact assessments, however few national model BITs or
existing BITs contain them. Impact assessment requirements expressly codified in

217. TPP, supra note 132, art. 19.3.
218. Id art. 19.6.
219.

European

Agreement Establishing an Association between Central America, on the one hand, and the

Union and

its Member States, on the other, 2012/734, 2012 O.J. (L 346)

1,

http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/march/tradoc_147660.pdf.

220. Id (emphasis added).
221. Inta Droi, The European Parliament's Role in Relation to Human Rights in Trade and
2014),
13,
(Feb.
9
Agreements
Investment
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/inta/dv/studyhr-tradeagreements_/stu
dy hr tradeagreements en.pdf.

222. IISD Model, supra note 141, art. 12.
223. SADC MODEL, supranote 54, art. 13.
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BITs are helpful in theory, but most of the examples merely require assessments
"as required by the laws of the Host State[.]" 224 There is not much purpose in
creating additional burdens on investors when the assessment requirements are
"consistent with domestic law in virtually every State today." 22 5 States seeking to
enhance domestic regulations relating to pre-entry impact assessment requirements
may fear that the regulatory adjustment would violate obligations under its BITs.
However, if assessment standards in the IIA merely match the standards of the host
state's domestic regulations, no additional policy space would be created, and the
assessment requirements would be toothless. In these situations, general exceptions
for environmental and human rights regulations, as discussed previously, would be
more effective.
Few of these additional positive obligations are likely to be commonly used;
many would assign arbitral tribunals topics for consideration outside of their
mandated scope. Some passive provisions are tenable options for inclusion,
particularly the 'essential elements' clause. In general, whether through
preambular provisions, interpretive language, general exceptions clauses, other
type of provision, states are increasingly seeking ways to maintain domestic policy
space when engaging in HAs. As the UNGP recommends, each state is to make its
own determination as to how much domestic policy space is needed to achieve its
sustainable development goals and to weigh the benefits and risks of each method
of maintaining the ability to meet international human rights obligations. 226
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The fact that disagreements are brought to the decision of a third party, such
as an ICSID arbitral tribunal, and that a country has offered to do so in a treaty
strengthens rather than detracts from a country's endeavor to attract foreign
investment and treat investors fairly and equitably. 227
The tribunal in MTD v. Chile asserts that participating in dispute resolution in
response to a claim emanating from an IA can help a nation attract FDI. FDI does
play a key role in development and in advancing economic and social rights
enumerated in the ICESCR and other human rights treaties. However, the benefits
to a state resulting from additional FDI may be outweighed by the negative impact
that persistent unintended investor-state claims can have on a country's domestic
policy space.
To strike a balance between attracting investment and abrogating policy
space, states now seek to implement UNGP Article 9 recommendations into their
IIAs through diverse methodology. To accomplish this, some states are choosing to
renegotiate existing BITs. Others look to advance new IIAs and regional free trade
associations which supersede exiting BITs.

224.
225.
226.
227.

Id.
Id. art. 13, Commentary.
UNGP, supranote 1.
MTD Equity, supra note 66,

1 89.
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The interpretation of treatment provisions has been derided as especially
invasive of domestic policy space to regulate human rights. The methods available
to remedy failures in treatment provisions in traditional IIAs include through the
inclusion of preambular language, interpretive provisions, general exceptions
provisions, passive provisions, and positive obligations. Some are more widelyaccepted and effective than others. The inclusion of direct references to existing
human rights treaties and ILO obligations seem to be the most popular. The
inclusion of interpretive language relating to FET standard is now universally
accepted as fundamental to any IIA. The various methodology for implementing
UNGP Article 9 recommendations highlighted herein do not make for a complete
or exhaustive list.
There is also a need for capacity building by NGO's, IGO's, state policy
makers, and regulatory enforcement departments in regards to assessing the impact
of investment on human rights. The lack of resources in developing states to
effectively regulate and enforce their human rights obligations exacerbates the
issue. To maximize the effectiveness of the UNGP 'policy space' decree in
developing states, the UN should provide states with additional resources by
engaging in domestic capacity building on rule of law issues. Tribunals can also
participate in healing this divide by beginning to take into consideration the
respondent state's level of development. Developed nations should consider the
differentiated level of responsibility they have towards helping developing nations
achieve their policy goals, and should assist as much as possible with policy
development in this regard. 2 2 t
It is yet to be seen what effect, if any, progressive IIAs have on encouraging
or discouraging FDI inflows, as there is not yet a consistent body of arbitration
decisions reliant on them. 229 It is uncertain whether claims which most drastically

restrict a state's policy space regarding human rights regulation are less likely to be
brought under an IIA with progressive provisions.
Surely, it will be less difficult for developing nations to defend legitimate
policy decisions under an agreement which conforms to the UNGP's
recommendations; many of the provisions examined herein explicitly protect those
legitimate policy decisions. The responsibility then rests on states which adopt the
UNGP's recommendations to regulate, administer, and enforce laws which protect
their own citizens. Hopefully arbitral tribunals will welcome this new generation of
IIAs by more amply considering states' rights to regulate to meet their
international human rights obligations in accordance with the intent of the drafters
and the UNGP, and uphold the protections which reduce the regulatory chill. If
they do, IIAs can be instruments which invite investment without restricting state's
policy space regarding human rights regulation. Developing nations with
progressive IIA regimes can then begin to reap the benefits resulting from
simultaneous increases in human rights regulation and FDI inflows, most
228. See G.A. Res. 151/26, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Aug. 12, 1992).
229. Spears, supra note 25, at 1045.
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importantly, an overall increase in the welfare of its citizens through sustainable
economic and social development.
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